This paper provides three short and very simple proofs of the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. The theorem is …rst proved in the case with only two individuals in the economy. The many individual case follows then from an induction argument (over the number of individuals). The proof of the theorem is further simpli…ed when the voting rule is assumed to be neutral.
Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to present short and very simple proofs of the classical Gibbard -Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard (1973) , Satterthwaite (1975) ). In its original form the theorem says that if a …nite number of individuals have to select one among a …nite number of alternatives by some kind of voting rule where sincere reporting of preferences is in the selfinterest of the individuals (strategy-proofness), then the voting rule has to be dictatorial.
Among the existing proofs of this theorem, one can distinguish two di¤er-ent lines. The …rst one, and the common one, is based on Arrow's impossibility theorem and exploits the correspondence between strategy-proofness and the independence of irrelevant alternatives requirement. The other approach to prove the theorem is more direct and can be found in e.g. Barberá (1983) and in Barberá and Peleg (1990) . In particular, the paper of Barberá and Peleg provides a short and elegant proof of the theorem in the case with two individuals in the economy.
Here we also employ the direct approach and …rst prove the theorem when there are two individuals. The proof and the arguments in this paper di¤er from the proof in Barberá and Peleg in the two individual case, and in addition, we follow up with a simple induction proof in the many (but …nite) individual case.
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The proof is further simpli…ed when the voting rule is assumed to be neutral.
The voting model analyzed so far is a model with a …nite number of indivisible public goods. A second objective of the present study is to analyze the consequences of adding a divisible private good (money) to the basic model, a good that can be used for various monetary compensations depending on which public good is chosen.
The well-known analysis of strategy-proof allocation of a discrete public good and money in e.g. Clark (1971) , Groves (1973) , Green and La¤ont (1979) , leads to a complete characterization of possible allocation mechanisms. Here we will make an assumption not made in those studies; we will assume the voting rule to be nonbossy. On the other hand, there will be no problems with budget balance in our model.
The …ndings in this study show that the introduction of the nonbossiness condition -no individual can a¤ect the outcome of the voting procedure without a¤ect the outcome for himself -implies that only a …nite number of income (money) distributions are compatible with strategy-proofness. The 1 In the many individual case Barberá and Peleg have more complicated arguments than those we use in our induction proof, but on the other hand they also prove the theorem under more general assumptions, e.g. the number of alternatives may be in…nite. result is then that a "mechanism designer" is bound to select a "dictator" and in addition, for each possible public good, determine an income distribution. The distribution has to be independent of individual preferences but may depend on the public good. If there is some kind of statistical information on e.g. the distribution of preferences among the individuals, this information can be used to select the various income distributions. So the dictatorial result from the original voting model remains, but the presence of a divisible good can to a limited extent be used to make compensations for di¤erences in individual preferences, e.g. in order to maximize the expected value of a social welfare function.
The paper is organized as follows. The original voting model is presented in Section 2, some useful lemmas are given in Section 3, while the two individual case and the many individual case where neutrality is assumed, are to be …nd in Section 4. In Section 5 the purely public good model is extended to the model with a private divisible good (money), and the class of strategy-proof voting rules (or allocation mechanisms) is derived. Finally, in the Appendix an induction proof for the many individual case in the purely public good case is given. In addition, the proof in the two individual case along the lines in Barberá and Peleg (1990) are given there.
The voting model
The original voting model is well-known so we will only give a short description of the basic elements. Let N = f1; 2; : : : : ; ng be a …nite set of individuals and let A = fa 1 ; a 2 ; : : : : a m g be a …nite set of social alternatives. The elements in A are public goods and called the objects. Preferences over A are rankings of the various objects (i.e. complete, transitive, asymmetric binary relations 2 ). The set of all possible rankings of A represented by utility functions is denoted U; so for a; b 2 A with a 6 = b and u 2 U; u(a) > u(b) or u(b) > u(a), but not both. Preference pro…les are elements in U = U n : A preference pro…le u = (u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : u n ) can also be denoted (u i ; u ¡i ) for i 2 N:
A voting rule is a mapping f from in U to A:
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A voting rule f is manipulable precisely when there is an individual i 2 N; preferences u 0 i 2 U , and a preference pro…le u 2 U; such that
If a voting rule is not manipulable, it is strategy-proof. A voting rule f is dictatorial if there 2 An alternative here is to assume that the individual preferences are complete and transitive binary relations, and hence allow for indi¤erences. Our more narrow class of preferences is, however, motivated by the desire to get short and simple proofs.
is an individual i 2 N (the dictator) such that u i (f (u))¸u i (a) for all a 2 A and for all u 2 U:
Let ¼ be a permutation of A -a change of names of the objects 4 . If u 2 U is a preference pro…le, a preference pro…le ¼u is de…ned as (¼u) i (a) = u i (¼ ¡1 (a)) for i 2 N and a 2 A: A voting rule f is neutral if, for all preference pro…les u 2 U, f (¼u) = ¼f (u): This means that the outcome of a neutral voting rule is independent of the names of the objects.
Finally, a voting rule f is onto if for each a 2 A there is a preference pro…le u 2 U such that f (u) = a: Obviously, a neutral voting rule is always onto.
The main theorem of this paper is:
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A strategy-proof voting rule that is onto is dictatorial if the number of objects is at least three.
Some useful lemmas
For the proof of the main theorem two useful and simple lemmas will be employed. The …rst one is a monotonicity lemma. It is a result that has been used in various forms before, but the proof is simple and we repeat it for completeness. The lemma says that a strategy-proof voting rule is constant for all changes of reported preferences such that alternatives worse than the outcome object (a) before the change are also worse than a after the change. More exactly:
Lemma 1 (monotonicity) Let f be a strategy-proof voting rule, u 2 U a preference pro…le, and f (u) = a: Then f (v) = a for all preference pro…les v 2 U such that for all x 2 A and i 2 N;
Proof. Suppose …rst that
From strategyproofness follows that u 1 (b) · u 1 (a); and hence from the assumption of the lemma, v 1 (b) · v 1 (a): Strategy-proofness also implies that v 1 (b)¸v 1 (a) and then, because preferences are strict, a = b: The lemma now follows after repeating the arguments above while changing the preferences for only i = 2; and then for only i = 3; and so forth.
The second lemma says that the outcome of a strategy-proof and onto voting rule must be (weakly) Pareto optimal.
Lemma 2 (Pareto optimality) Let f be a strategy-proof voting rule that is onto. If u 2 U is a preference pro…le and a; b 2 A; a 6 = b; two alternatives such that
Proof. Suppose that f (u) = b: Since f is onto there is a preference pro…le v 2 U such that f (v) = a: Let also u 0 2 U be a preference pro…le such that for all i 2 N;
4 The proof of the theorem under simplifying assumptions
First assume that the number of individuals is two. The following example illustrates the idea in the proof of the theorem in that case.
Example. Consider a situation with two individuals and three alternatives, a; b; c. To prove the theorem we …rst want to identify a dictator. Therefore consider a preference pro…le where both individuals consider the objects a and b to be better than c; but they have di¤erent highest ranked object. The preferences are illustrated in the matrix u below where individual i's ranking is given in column i, i = 1; 2. A Pareto consistent voting rule cannot select the object c (Lemma 2). Assume that the outcome (bold) of the voting rule is a when the preference pro…le is u: Then consider the preference pro…le v below:
The outcome in this case must also be a: The reason is that the outcome must be a or b by Pareto consistency but it cannot be b because of strategyproofness. But given a preference pro…le where the outcome (a) is the best alternative for one individual and the worst object for the other individual, it follows from monotonicity (Lemma 1) that the outcome of the voting rule is always a when the …rst individual reports a to be his best object. He becomes the dictator for this object.
In the formal proof below we show that each object has a dictator and then it must, of course, be the same individual for all objects.
Theorem 1 A strategy-proof voting rule f that is onto is dictatorial if the number of objects is at least three and the number of individuals is two.
Proof. Let u 2 U 2 be a preference pro…le and a; b 2 A two objects with a 6 = b such that
for all x 2 A ¡ fa; bg : Then f (u) = a or b by Pareto optimality (Lemma 2). Suppose that f (u) = a:
Now let preferences v 2 2 U satisfy
for all x 2 A ¡ fa; bg : Then f (u 1 ; v 2 ) = a or b by Pareto optimality (Lemma 2) and f (u 1 ; v 2 ) 6 = b by strategy-proofness. Hence f (u 1 ; v 2 ) = a:
such that a is the best object according to preferences u 0 1 : By repeating the analysis above for all pairs of objects from A we receive two sets A i ½ A; i = 1; 2; where A i contains those objects x such that the outcome of f is always x if individual i reports x to be his best object.
Let
From the construction of A 1 and A 2 follows that #A 3 · 1: Since the voting rule is a function and m¸3; one of the sets A 1 and A 2 must be empty. We have assumed that a 2 A 1 so A 2 = ?: Finally A 3 = ?; because if c 2 A 3 ; let u 2 U 2 be a preference pro…le such that
for all x 2 A ¡ fa; cg : By the arguments above, c 2 A 1 or a 2 A 2 ; which is a contradiction. Hence A 1 = A and i = 1 is a dictator.
If we had assumed that a 2 A 2 at the beginning of the proof then individual 2 had become a dictator.
A neutral voting rule and m¸n:
In the appendix we provide a short induction proof of the theorem in the general case with an arbitrary but …nite number of individuals. To get a simple and direct proof of the theorem without induction based on the two individual case, we will here make two additional and simplifying assumptions. The …rst one is to assume that there are at least as many objects as there are individuals, i.e. m¸n: Second we will assume neutrality, i.e. that the outcome of the voting rule is independent of the names of the objects. We may note that a neutral voting rule trivially is also onto, so Lemma 2 is still valid.
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To illustrate the simple idea in the proof -which is a generalization of the idea in the proof of Theorem 1 -consider the following example.
Example. There are four individuals and …ve objects, a; b; c; d; e. The main step in the proof is to identify one individual and one object such that if the individual reports that particular object to be his best object the object will also be the outcome of the voting rule. Then, by neutrality, that individual will be a dictator.
Therefore consider a preference pro…le where the various individuals have permuted rankings of four object a; b; c; d; but all consider e to be the worst object. The preferences are illustrated in the matrix u below. Here the ranking of individual i is given in column i; i = 1; 2; 3; 4: All objects in the pro…le u 1 ranked higher than a are also ranked higher than a in the pro…le u. Then by monotonicity (Lemma 1), the outcome of the voting rule in this case must also be a. Next consider the preference pro…les 5 We may also note that the preceding proof of the theorem presupposes that there are at least three alternatives (m¸3). However, by assuming neutrality that particular requirement is super ‡uous. By Pareto consistency the outcome of the voting rule given the preference pro…le u 2 cannot be b; c or e because they are dominated by the object d. Moreover, strategy-proofness excludes d to be the outcome and hence a is still the outcome. The same arguments show that a must be the outcome given the pro…les u 3 and u
4
. But now follows immediately from monotonicity (Lemma 1) that the outcome of the voting rule is a as soon as individual 1 reports a to be his best object. Finally, neutrality shows that individual 1 is a dictator.
In the theorem below these ideas are formalized.
Theorem 2 A strategy-proof voting rule f that is neutral is dictatorial if the number of objects is at least three and at least as many as there are individuals, m¸n:
Proof. Let u 2 U be de…ned as
This means that the various individual rankings of the n …rst objects are permuted. Those objects are also ranked before objects with label j > n: By Pareto consistency (Lemma 2), f (u) = a j for some j · n: Assume that j = 1: Let u 0 2 U be de…ned as u 0 1 (a 1 ) = n + 2 and u 0 1 (a n ) = n + 1; u 0 i (a n ) = n + 2 and u 0 i (a 1 ) = n + 1 for i > 1; u 0 i (a j ) = u i (a j ) for j 6 = 1 and j 6 = n:
Hence all individuals consider the objects a 1 and a n to be better than the other objects. Also note that the ranking of a 1 and a n is the same in the pro…les u and u 0 ; and in u 0 ,the objects a 1 and a n are both ranked before the other objects. Hence by monotonicity (Lemma 1), f (u 0 ) = f (u) = a 1 : Finally de…ne pro…les u k 2 U, k = 1; 2; 3; : : : n ¡ 1 recursively according to
k+1 (a 1 ) = ¡m:
In the utility pro…le u n ; a 1 is the best object for individual 1, while it is the worst object for all other individuals. Monotonicity (Lemma 1) then implies that f (u) = a 1 as soon as individual 1 reports a 1 to be his best object. Then by neutrality, individual 1 becomes a dictator.
The voting model with monetary compensations
Now assume that in addition to the public goods in A there is a divisible good called money to be distributed. A certain positive quantity e 2 R + is available. Consumption bundles are now (a; x i ) 2 A £ R + : Let D = fx 2 R n + such that § i x i = eg be the set of feasible income distributions and A £ D the set of feasible allocations. Preferences over consumption bundles are represented by quasi-linear utility functions u i (a) + x i ; u i 2 U and pro…les are as before, u 2 U: A voting rule f is now a mapping from U to the set of feasible allocations, i.e. f (u) = (a; x) 2 A £ D: The notation f i (u) = (a; x i ); i 2 N; is also used.
In this case we call a voting rule object onto if every public good is attainable, i.e. for each a 2 A there is a pro…le u 2 U such that f (u) = (a; x) for some feasible income distribution x: Note, however, that we do not require that every income distribution is attainable.
A voting rule f is manipulable if there is a pro…le u 2 U; an individual i 2 N and preferences v i 2 U such that if f (u) = (a; x) and f (v i ; u ¡i ) = (b; y) then v i (b)+y i > u i (a)+x i : If the voting rule is not manipulable, it is strategyproof.
In this case we de…ne a voting rule f to be dictatorial if there is an individual i 2 N (the dictator) such that the outcome of the voting rule always maximizes the utility of the dictator among possible outcomes of the voting rule. Hence a dictator has now a weaker position than in the case with only public goods, because not all income distributions are necessarily attainable. Formally, i 2 N is a dictator if
for all (a; x); (b; y) 2 A £ D such that f (u) = (a; x) and f (v) = (b; y) for some u; v 2 U:
A voting rule f is nonbossy 6 if for all preferences v i 2 U and pro…les u 2 U;
A consequence of nonbossiness is that if a particular object has been chosen, no individual can change the distribution of money by changing his preferences unless his own money holding is a¤ected. This is not the case in e.g. the Clark -Groves mechanism, where an individual may a¤ect other individuals' bundles by changing his preferences without a¤ecting the own allotted bundle.
The theorem of this section is the following 7 :
Theorem 3 Let f be a nonbossy voting rule that is object onto. Then f is strategy-proof if and only if there is a dictator i and a distribution function
To prove the theorem, a monotonicity lemma will be used.
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity) Let f be a SPNB voting rule. Then, for any pro…le u 2 U, any i 2 N and any utility function
Proof. Let u 2 U, i 2 N and v i 2 U satisfy the presumptions in the lemma and suppose that f (v i ; u ¡i ) = (b; y). Then by strategy-proofness,
and hence,
so b = a must be the case, and hence,
The concept of nonbossiness is due to Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) .
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For similar result with private indivisible goods, see Ohseto (1999) , Schummer (2000) or Svensson and Larsson (2000) .
Proof of Theorem 3:
First it is obvious that f is strategy-proof if there is a distribution function ¿ and a dictator. Now assume that f is strategy-proof and we show the existence of a distribution function ¿ and a dictator. Let u; v 2 U, with f (u) = (a; x) and f (v) = (a; y): We …rst prove that x = y: De…ne a pro…le w 2 U by
By Lemma 3 and nonbossiness, f (w) = f (u) and f (w) = f (v): Hence x = y: This means that there is a well de…ned function ¿ :
But now it follows from the Gibbard-Satterthwaithe theorem that f is dictarorial.
Remark. Note that the analysis above is valid only for those preference pro…les u 2 U where there are no indi¤erences, i.e. u i (a)+¿ i (a) 6 = u i (b)+¿ i (b) if a 6 = b: So our result is true for "almost all" pro…les u 2 U:
Appendix
The following is an alternative proof of Theorem 1. The proof is almost the same as the one in Barberá and Peleg (1990) . It is a simple proof but a rather di¤erent type of arguments are used here compared to the …rst proof of Theorem 1.
For given preferences u 1 2 U; let ®(u 1 ) = fa 2 A; a = f (u 1 ; u 2 ) for some preferences u 2 2 U g ;
i.e. ®(u 1 ) is the range of f for …xed preferences u 1 : Obviously the set ®(u 1 ) is the choice set of individual 2 when the preferences of individual 1 are u 1 : When individual 2 has reported his preferences u 2 ; a strategy-proof voting rule f requires that the outcome is the best object in ®(u 1 ) according to u 2 :
The set ®(u 1 ) will play a central role in the proof of the theorem. The basic idea is to prove that ®(u 1 ) contains exactly one object for all preferences u 1 implying that individual 1 is a dictator, or that ®(u 1 ) = A for all preferences u 2 implying that individual 2 is a dictator. The properties of ®(u 1 ) are revealed by a number of small lemmas.
Lemma 4 If a is the best object in A according to u 1 2 U; then a 2 ®(u 1 ):
Proof. Follows directly from Pareto optimality (Lemma 2).
Lemma 5 If a is the best object in A according to u 1 2 U as well as to u 
Such preferences exists since f is onto. Now let u 2 2 U be preferences such that u 2 (b) > u 2 (w) > u 2 (x) for all x 2 A¡fw; bg : But then by strategy-proofness, f (u 1 ; u 2 ) = w and f (u 0 1 ; u 2 ) = b; so f is manipulable -a contradiction. Lemma 7 If #®(u 1 ) > 1 for some preferences u 1 2 U; then ®(u 1 ) = A:
Proof. Let a be the best and w the worst object in ®(u 1 ) according to u 1 : Suppose that there is an object b 2 A¡®(u 1 ): Let u By Lemma 5 we can assume that a 6 = w without loss of generality. Also let u 2 2 U be preferences such that u 2 (w) > u 2 (a) > u 2 (x) for all x 2 A¡fa; wg : Then f (u 0 1 ; u 2 ) = w and f (u 00 1 ; u 2 ) = a; and hence f is manipulable -a contradiction.
The alternative proof of Theorem 1: If #®(u 1 ) = 1 for all preferences u 1 2 U then by Lemma 4 individual 1 is a dictator, and if #®(u 1 ) > 1 for some preferences u 1 2 U then by Lemma 8, ®(u 1 ) = A for all preferences, and hence individual 2 is a dictator. Now let the number of individuals be any …nite number. The main theorem then follows from an induction argument.
Theorem 4 A strategy-proof voting rule f that is onto is dictatorial if the number of objects is at least three.
Proof. Assume that the theorem is true for p individuals, p < n. We shall prove that it is also true for p + 1 individuals. Since the theorem is true for p = 2 by Theorem 1, it then follows by induction that the theorem is true for n:
Let g be a voting rule with two individuals de…ned as g(u 1 ; v) = f (u 1 ; v : : : v):
The voting rule g is onto by Pareto optimality (Lemma 2) since f is onto. The voting rule g is also strategy-proof. Because if it is not, there are pro…les (u 1 ; v) and (u 1 ; v 0 ) in U 2 ; and objects a; b 2 A such that g(u 1 ; v) = a and g(u First, if i = 1 is the dictator for g then by Lemma 1 he is also dictator for f:
Second, if i = 2 is the dictator for g, let u ¤ 1 2 U be …xed preferences and consider the voting rule h(u 2 : : : u p+1 ) = f (u ¤ 1 ; u 2 : : : u p+1 ) with p individuals. The voting rule h is strategy-proof, and it is onto because i = 2 is a dictator for g. Then, by the induction assumption, h is dictatorial. Suppose that i = 2 is the dictator for h and consider the voting rule q(u 1 ; u 2 ) = f (u 1 ; u 2 ; u ¤ 3 : : : u ¤ p+1 ) for arbitrarily …xed preferences u ¤ i 2 U; i¸3: The voting rule q is strategyproof and onto, and hence dictatorial. But i = 1 cannot be the dictator so it must be i = 2: Since u ¤ i 2 U was arbitrarily chosen i = 2 is the dictator for f for all preference pro…les in U p+1 :
